Editor’s Note: Faced with designing and implementing both a safety instrumented system (SIS) and a basic process control system (BPCS), project team leaders must assess their goals and choose how the two systems will form an architecture to securely deliver the process engineering, safety, and operation capabilities required.

Top of mind for these decision makers is how to create and maintain a defendable environment for each system that will also bring efficiencies to the overall project and allow the systems to operate effectively and sustain security for years to come.

This article series presents the three most common approaches to SIS and BPCS interaction for distributed control system applications.

By Sergio Diaz and Alexandre Peixoto
Part 2
As described in the previous article, “Considerations in Choosing a Defendable Safety System Architecture,” the three approaches to safety instrumented system (SIS) architecture offer degrees of integration between the SIS and a basic process control system (BPCS), particularly a distributed control system (DCS). Each methodology appeals to cybersecurity concerns and unique organizational requirements.

“While all three integration approaches have their merits,” ARC Advisory Group found, “the integrated-but-separate approach will ultimately become the architecture of choice for many end users, since it offers the most potential to minimize common cybersecurity threats between the systems.”

In addition to acknowledging the cybersecurity strengths of the integrated approach, it is important to evaluate the impact in terms of engineering, installation, and commissioning. This article describes the integrated approach and the strengths it brings to teams as they engineer an SIS and a BPCS.

The integrated SIS architecture nests the BPCS and SIS yet keeps them safely separate. The SIS and the BPCS/BPCS share costs of protection layers and connection points.


Eliminating Weak Links
Engineered links among systems typically require extra countermeasures to ensure secure operation. To engineer these links means using additional protocols — often open protocols — which, if engineered improperly, can ultimately increase potential points of failure or introduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

When a change is required to the SIS or BPCS, any related mapping in the engineered interface between the BPCS and SIS might also need to be changed. If the initial project team is not available to perform the change and ensure its cybersecurity readiness, newer personnel must reinvent the wheel to make changes — ultimately running the risk of introducing more security vulnerabilities.

But in an integrated system, there are typically mechanisms in place to automatically prevent the introduction of additional cybersecurity risks. Such systems likely do not require an engineered link between the two systems. The integrated approach simplifies the connection between the two systems and maintains that connection across the lifecycle of the equipment.

Systems such as the DeltaV distributed control system (DCS) and DeltaV SIS can detect the source of any changes, detect corruption in packets, and automatically perform some validation on data moving from the BPCS to SIS (and vice versa) to ensure that changes are authentic. In the interfaced architecture approach, a similar validation can be created on an engineered link between two different systems, but it requires complicated and time-consuming effort that can be avoided – as described below.

Project Engineering for an Integrated Approach
Engineering represents certain unavoidable costs to an automation project. But by using the integrated SIS approach, an organization can reduce those costs by eliminating some engineering tasks, reducing overlap in responsibilities, and avoiding rework.

Savings arise from reductions in or even elimination of engineering activities such as data mapping. In fact, no data mapping is required in the integrated approach. Engineers do not need to track the relationship between SIS data and BPCS, thus reducing costly data-entry errors during start-up and streamlining maintenance later. No handshaking logic is required either. To monitor the health of the communication link in interfaced systems, it is common to implement watchdog applications, which are not needed in an integrated approach due to the coordinated diagnostics.

Efficient project engineering is further enhanced through a common engineering environment where the integrated SIS and BPCS generally employ the same engineering workstations and tools with the same look-and-feel. (The graphic below shows the elements shared between the SIS and BPCS in the integrated approach.) If, however, as with an interfaced system, a great deal of engineering work must be put into creating interfaces between the systems, missing a potential attack vector is much easier—putting the process at risk.

The common environment available in integrated SIS architecture means that engineers working on the systems will have a similar experience and will require less training time. Project engineers also save time by working in the SIS and BPCS common environment as they, for example, assign unique user privileges for the BPCS and SIS.

Separate and shared system components for integrated approach


Installation, Testing, and Commissioning in the Integrated Environment
After some of the initial engineering is complete, additional time is saved in installation. System cabinets and field enclosures for DCS and SIS are similar, which facilitates the design and installation. An integrated approach might require fewer components, for example there is no need for HART multiplexers for routing HART information from HART field devices. The use of multiplexers not only increases the amount of hardware, it also creates additional links that would need to be cyber protected.

As the project moves to factory acceptance testing (FAT), tasks are simplified due to the inherent communications between the systems—the configuration on any side can be updated easily as testing proceeds.

Finally, commissioning. The integrated environment optimizes accuracy and coordination among the commissioning teams because the process and device data are shared electronically and therefore data are consistent across the SIS and BPCS. Common commissioning tools are used for both SIS and BPCS.

Assigning privileges to team members is simplified in the integrated architecture. This eases cybersecurity concerns because, although similar, the blocks for the SIS and the BPCS are different and the privileges are given separately for each module and can be segregated by module type or node.

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Sergio Diaz is product manager for safety systems at Emerson and Alexandre Peixoto, is product marketing manager for cybersecurity at Emerson.

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